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Introduction
Consequences of emergencies and crisis 
situations lead to direct and indirect threats to lives, 
health and the environment in which we occur. 
It is badly needed to identify the impacts of various 
emergencies and crisis situations and propose steps 
to mitigate their impacts. One signifi cant part of crisis 
management is to search for and mitigate the risks 
threatening the population dependent on assistance 
and care in health facilities. These facilities perform 
regular and constant care of clients who have 
reduced self-suffi ciency due to health reasons, and it 
is necessary to provide them with such services even 
during the emergency or crisis situation.
The basic function of the state in emergencies 
and crisis situations in the health sector is to ensure 
urgent health care and public health protection. 
Exactly these services are based on the functionality 
of the entire system of facilities within health 
infrastructure of the state. In addressing emergencies 
and crisis situations, the health care system must 
always be understood as a whole. Legal regulations 
(Act 239, 2000; Act 240, 2004; Decree 380, 2000) 
and the methodology of the Ministry of Interior 
regarding the preparation of crisis preparedness 
plans for health care facilities such as hospitals 
(Methodology of preparing crisis preparedness 
plans) show that health care facilities are processors 
of crisis preparedness plans, whereas these plans 
describe the organization of relevant activities 
and provision of relevant resources (material and 
personnel) necessary to secure the task of legal 
persons for the duration of the crisis situation.
Healthcare facilities have an irreplaceable role 
in the health system because medical personnel 
cannot be replaced by lay volunteers; therefore, 
preventive measures in this direction focus on the 
best possible protection and security of specialist 
staff. In case of emergency and crisis situations, 
very important aspect of medical facilities is the 
ability to maintain the capacity and capabilities of 
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such facilities. In the event of emergencies and crisis 
situations with a duration of tens of days or longer, 
the preparedness and effectiveness of the system of 
emergency management has a limit signifi cance for 
the functionality of the entire health system. 
Healthcare facilities providing health care must 
be adequately staffed, materially and technically 
equipped for the type and scope of health care which 
they provide. Particular specifi cation of requirements 
for material and technical equipment of health 
facilities are given in the Decree on requirements 
for the minimum technical and material equipment 
of health facilities and home care contact centres 
(Decree 92, 2012). These requirements state that 
medical facilities must enable functional and safe 
operation in terms of engineering requirements for 
spaces and their functional and layout arrangement. 
To ensure that health facilities can provide medical 
care under any circumstances, it is necessary to defi ne 
and confi gure the system of their preparedness. 
Some cases of electrical power failures show 
us how important it is to address not only technical 
aspects but also the impact on the population. 
In the US, after a blackout in 2003, they started to 
analyse medical facilities and explore their readiness 
and ability to provide medical care even during 
electrical power outages. The research took place in 
health facilities in Ohio, Michigan and New York. 
It turned out that the biggest problem during 
the power outage consisted in malfunctions of 
communication channels, problems with diesel 
generators which ceased to supply power, failures of 
manpower and other psychological factors. Power 
outages had a major impact on the functionality of 
healthcare infrastructure and healthcare delivery. 
Good news was that mortality or morbidity did not 
rise (Kile et al., 2005).
In early 2012, a big problem was the blackout 
in Slovenia (Czech Television, 2012). One hundred 
and fi fty thousand households were without 
electricity supply for several days. The situation was 
so complicated because the outage happened during 
heavy snowfall and Slovenia was literally covered 
with ice. People remained without heat, water and 
food supplies. To resolve the situation, the Slovenian 
government called in the army and asked for help 
by the European Union and neighbouring countries, 
including the Czech Republic (Marek and Vojtěch, 
2014). 
Another example is the storm that hit California 
on February 9, 2014. The worst affected place was 
the district of Sonoma where the storm caused 
a series of electricity outages and about 
5000 people remained without supplies of food and 
water (Hansen and McCallum, 2014). 
Regarding larger outages, it is possible to mention 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, formed in the Caribbean 
area on October 22, 2012, which struck the east 
coast of the United States, where it caused damage 
in the order of tens of billions of dollars (Koplowitz, 
2012). On the east coast of the United States, about 
6 million people in seven states remained without 
electric energy supplies for several days. During 
the storm, it was necessary to evacuate the Tish 
University Hospital in New York, where diesel 
generators totally failed. Patients were transported 
by ambulances to nearby hospitals (McCoy and 
Weise, 2012; Redlener, 2012).
Materials and methods
In the context of assessing the preparedness of 
hospitals to power outages, it was fi rst necessary 
to assess the healthcare planning in terms of legal 
standards and standards of non-legislative nature. 
It was necessary to focus on the individual laws 
and concepts that are mandatory for solving the 
preparedness of hospitals, and determine the most 
important standards that help to consolidate this 
system. Based on this analysis, it was possible to 
compile a key questionnaire and collect data in 
individual hospitals using the PAPI method (Hendl, 
2005), and sort and assess these data afterwards. 
The assessment was based on using the SWOT 
method which enabled to simply and effi ciently 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of the overall 
preparedness system and identify key elements that 
would lead to the improvement of the system.
Planning in healthcare
Planning in healthcare, related to its security, 
should be based on determining the critical aspects 
of healthcare or critical aspects for the population 
in case of failure of or damage to the healthcare 
system. It is mainly due to the fact that contemporary 
threats aim at vital and state-protected interests. 
For planning in the healthcare sector, in addition to 
the Conception of crisis preparedness in healthcare 
(Conception, 2007), there are also type plans and 
plans for emergency preparedness (Fišer, 2006). 
Currently, 22 types of threats with unacceptable 
risk are defi ned. For all these types of threats, it 
is necessary to develop new type plans by the end 
of 2017. One of the type plans is the type plan 
“Epidemics - mass infection of persons”, which falls 
within the competency of the Ministry of Health.
Other plans are plans for crissis preparedness, 
serving for designated entities to protect their own 
operations in crisis situations. This plan can also 
serve as a basis for drawing a traumatological plan 
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of healthcare providers. Within the framework of 
the activities of specialized departments of health 
regions, the basis for crisis management is also 
the coordination and supervision over fulfi lling the 
tasks from the regional crisis plan in the concerned 
medical facilities, i.e. hospitals in our case, namely 
the preparation of the plan of crissis preparedness. 
This plan is processed by medical facilities and 
medical institutes to ensure the performance of 
activities and their competencies in case of crisis 
situations. Crisis preparedness of the health facilities 
must eliminate any unpredictable situation to which 
such facilities are not able to respond (Fišer, 2006).
As mentioned above, the primary function of the 
state in crisis and emergency situations is to ensure 
emergency health care and protection of public 
health. During their operation, large hospitals fumble 
with occasional dysfunctions, such as lack of clean 
laundry for beds in intensive care (intensive care 
units) and resuscitation (anaesthetic-resuscitation 
wards), pneumatic post overloads or stoppages 
at peak times, malfunction of devices before the 
weekend with service not available until Monday, 
shortage of beds in intensive care, etc. For these 
reasons, sudden and unexpected outages - affecting 
the whole hospital or its part and interfering with 
its operation and activities - are very demanding. 
Preparedness for these situations is therefore very 
necessary.
Electricity outages are considered one of the 
most serious threats to economic development. 
Global Risks (2014) report pointed to a high 
probability of blackouts with extensive economic 
impacts (Pourbeiket al., 2006). Blackout may affl ict 
any country worldwide. One of the large-scale 
blackouts occurred in north-eastern and central parts 
of the United States and hit several hospitals at the 
same time. Electricity outage occurred in 2003 and 
affected a total of four hospitals. Electricity began to 
be gradually connected after 12 hours and supplies 
were fully restored after 72 hours. The biggest 
complications included connection problems within 
hospitals, with other hospitals, within the city and 
district, and with the state emergency management 
centre; updated lists for calling doctors and staff 
were not at disposal, hospital pagers did not 
function, reception by mobile phones was sporadic, 
internet and intranet networks were unavailable 
and communication system of rescue services did 
not work. Another problem was the fact that the 
rescue service recorded a number of unnecessary 
calls despite announcements in the media not to call 
a hotline except urgent situations. For hospitals and 
their patients, this outage meant dysfunctional labs, 
most of the elevators did not work, some emergency 
wards lost most of electricity, it was not possible to 
pump oil, morgues had no other source of electricity, 
refrigerators with drugs were not connected to 
emergency circuits, pressure in water pipes was low, 
fl ush toilets did not function, it was not possible to 
carry out laboratory tests, etc.
Czech national standards in healthcare
ČSN 33 2140 “Electrical wiring in rooms for 
medical purposes” (Technical Standard, 1987) 
applies to the design, operation and maintenance 
of electrical wiring in rooms for medical purposes, 
which are located in healthcare facilities. According 
to this standard, demands on electrical equipment 
and methods of their ensuring are normalized in 
13 requirements. The most important requirements 
with regard to emergency preparedness include 
requirement GE = Main emergency source 
of electrical power, and requirements E1 and 
E2 = Special emergency sources of electricity. 
In addition, the standard provides a tabular list 
of requirements for different rooms and time 
periods of operational tests according to the above 
requirements. The standard has a total of 11 annexes 
which mainly contain examples of some special 
solutions.
New ČSN 33 2000-7-710 (Technical Standard, 
2013) came into force in 2013. For designers, 
installers, inspection techniques and operational 
techniques in medical facilities, this brings 
a challenging period during which they must learn 
to reliably apply the new standard and also maintain 
the existing electrical wiring in perfect condition 
according to the old standard ČSN 33 2140 until 
its reconstruction. The existence of this standard 
gives guidance to healthcare facilities regarding the 
emergency power sources which must be acquired 
and wards which must be kept operational. 
Data collection
For the purpose of examining and assessing the 
preparedness of hospitals to power outages, we used 
a pilot study covering selected hospitals established 
by Regions and the Ministry of Health. 
For the purposes of data collection, as research 
objects, we selected health care facilities providing 
inpatient care (standard acute inpatient care, 
intensive acute inpatient care, subsequent inpatient 
care, long-term inpatient care) pursuant to the act on 
health services and terms of their provision, where 
founders are regions and the Ministry of Health 
(Act 372, 2011).
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Data collection was using the PAPI method 
which offers many positives, mostly in the approach 
to interviewees (respondents). One of the positives 
is the direct contact with the interviewee. In 
each hospital, the given problem was explained 
and each question was additionally clarifi ed in 
case of misunderstanding. The answers of the 
respondents were austere and distant; conversely, 
they were supplemented with additional information 
concerning the specifi cs of each hospital. This 
makes the data relevant. Subsequently, the collected 
data were assessed using the SWOT analysis.
Results
Individual information regarding the 
preparedness to power outages is collectively 
written for each hospital. In each hospital, it was 
necessary to acquire general information regarding 
the supply of electricity: distributor, number of 
electricity service lines, and the eventual use of 
other alternative sources of electricity. 
Subsequently, it was necessary to fi nd out specifi c 
information with regard to operational restrictions in 
the event of an outage. It was necessary to identify 
wards which will not function in such a case, wards 
which will still provide care and the extent of this 
care (whether the care will be restricted or not). 
The last point of the analysis was to identify 
emergency power sources. The analysis focused on 
the issue of emergency sources that the hospital has 
- wards which have their own emergency source and 
wards connected to the main emergency source. It 
was necessary to analyse the amount of fuel available 
to various hospitals and ascertain the time during 
which the hospitals are self-suffi cient (according to 
the average consumption of diesel generators, which 
is very highly variable depending on instantaneous 
take-offs). The results obtained are described in 
relation to individual hospitals. 
Hospital 1
Hospital 1 has four electricity service lines 
(two aerial lines and two cable lines). Distributor 
of this electricity is the company E.ON a.s., which 
is able to switch between these lines if necessary, 
whereas the supplies are brought from different 
substations. Directly in the premises of hospital 1, 
there is a gas cogeneration unit which produces 
electricity by burning gas; due to this fact, hospital 1 
heats the water and sells the electricity produced to 
the company E.ON a.s. Emergency power supply 
is secured through an UPS, diesel generator and 
batteries.
In the event of a power failure, the hospital 
would be forced to curtail its operations. This would 
mainly relate to restrictions on different kinds of 
radiodiagnostic examinations (CT, SONO, X-ray and 
skiascopy). Some hospital wards (ophthalmology, 
ORL, TRN, dermatovenorology, and others) would 
reduce their operation signifi cantly. Other parts of 
the hospital (such as a kitchen or laundry room) 
would not work.
During power outages, in terms of providing 
the hospital acute and inpatient care, it is necessary 
to ensure operation of critical wards (anaesthetic-
resuscitation ward, intensive care unit, surgery - 
operating theatres, and biochemistry ward). This can 
be achieved by ensuring adequate reserve (alternative) 
sources of electric power, which are defi ned by the 
new technical standard “Electrical wiring in rooms 
for medical purposes” (Technical Standard, 2013) and 
the still valid standard “Electrical wiring in rooms for 
medical purposes” (Technical Standard, 1987). These 
standards defi ne types of reserve sources which 
should be available in medical facilities.
The most important backup power source in 
hospital 1 is a diesel generator which is regularly 
tested once a week with load and once a week 
without load. Another reserve backup source is an 
UPS unit and the so-called battery room (room with 
rechargeable batteries - the old type of backup power 
source; at present, the system is gradually converted 
to new types of backup sources such as UPS). Types 
of alternative backup power sources in hospital 1 are 
presented in Tab. 1.
An important area of preparedness of hospitals 
to power outages is the amount of fuel available as 
fuel for diesel generators. In hospital 1, there are 
200 litres of diesel fuel directly nearby the diesel 
generator and other 200 litres of diesel oil in barrels. 
At the given average diesel generator consumption 
of 100 litres/hour, the operation of hospital 1 will 
be secured for 4 hours. After this period of time, 
hospital 1 will have to ensure delivery of oil, 
which is not covered by contract. According to the 
analysis of information, hospital 1 would ensure 
the oil purchase from the nearest fi lling station. 
The question is whether the fi lling station would be 
in operation during the power outage. 
Tab. 1 Types of alternative backup power sources
Alternative power 
source Number Output
Fuel 
consumption
UPS 1 3.5 kW -
Diesel generator 1 400 kW 100 - 120 litres/hour
Rechargeable batteries 2 16.8 kW -
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Hospital 2
Hospital 2 has two electricity service lines. 
Distributor of this electricity is the company E.ON 
a.s., which is able to switch between these lines if 
necessary, whereas the supplies are brought from two 
different substations. In hospital 2, the emergency 
power supply is secured by 4 UPS units and 2 diesel 
generators.
In the event of a power failure, the hospital 
would be forced to curtail its operations. This would 
mainly relate to restrictions on various kinds of 
radiodiagnostic examinations, specialized wards and 
operational-technical equipment. 
During power outages, in terms of providing 
the hospital acute and inpatient care, it is necessary 
to ensure operation of critical wards (anaesthetic-
resuscitation ward, intensive care unit, surgery - 
operating theatres, and biochemistry ward). This can 
be partly achieved by ensuring adequate alternative 
sources of electricity according to Technical 
Standards (2013 and 1987).
In hospital 2, the most important backup power 
sources are diesel generators which are regularly 
tested once a week with load and once a week without 
load. Other backup alternative sources are 4 UPS 
units which ensure the operation of the operating 
theatre, anaesthetic-resuscitation ward, neonatology 
and biochemistry ward. Types of alternative backup 
power sources in hospital 2 are presented in Tab. 2.
An important area of preparedness of hospitals 
to power outages is the amount of fuel available as 
fuel for diesel generators. In hospital 2, there are 
2 x 120 litres of diesel fuel directly nearby the diesel 
generator and other 2 barrels with the volume of 
200 litres. At the given average diesel generator 
consumption of 50 litres/hour, the operation of 
hospital 2 will be secured for 12 hours. One diesel 
generator will always be in operation. The other one 
is merely a backup. 
After this period of time, hospital 2 will have 
to ensure delivery of oil, which is not covered by 
contract. Hospital 2 would ensure the oil purchase 
from the nearest fi lling station. 
Tab. 2 Types of alternative backup power sources
Hospital 3
Hospital 3 has two electricity service lines. 
Distributor of this electricity is the company E.ON 
a.s. In hospital 3, the emergency power supply is 
secured by 3 UPS units, one diesel generator and 
3 mobile power generators.
In the event of a power failure, the hospital 
would be forced to curtail its operation in ordinary 
wards. In this hospital, only emergency elevators 
and emergency lighting would remain functional. 
The hospital would have to limit a number of 
specialized examinations (such as CT or X-ray) and 
operational-technical departments.
During power outages, in terms of providing 
the hospital acute and inpatient care, it is necessary 
to ensure operation of important wards specifi c to 
this hospital (intensive care unit, surgery - operating 
theatres, gynecological and maternity ward). 
This can be partly achieved by ensuring adequate 
alternative sources of electricity according to 
Technical Standards (2013 and 1987).
In hospital 3, the most important backup power 
source is a diesel generator which is regularly tested 
once a week with load and once a week without 
load. Other reserve backup sources are 3 UPS units 
which ensure the operation of the operating theatre, 
intensive care unit, gynecological and maternity 
ward. Types of alternative backup power sources in 
hospital 3 are presented in Tab. 3.
An important area of preparedness of hospitals to 
power outages is the amount of fuel available as fuel 
for diesel generators. In hospital 3, there are 400 litres 
of diesel fuel directly nearby the diesel generator 
and other barrels with the volume of 400 litres. 
At the given average diesel generator consumption 
of 60 litres/hour, the operation of hospital 3 will 
be secured for 13 hours. After this period of time, 
hospital 3 will have to ensure delivery of oil, which 
is not covered by contract. Hospital 3 would ensure 
the oil purchase from the nearest fi lling station.
In hospital 3, a signifi cant increase in preparedness 
to power outages was achieved through mobile power 
generators. The hospital has extensive experience 
in power outages, either in the form of cut-offs 
announced in advance by the company E.ON, a.s. or 
undesired incidents. With these events, the hospital 
faced problems that accompany power failure. From 
a technical point of view, emergency electricity was 
duly supplied but some wards remained without 
power. This was caused by a technical defect in the 
cable line that had to be addressed immediately. The 
quickest way was to buy a mobile power generator 
which proved good and become another alternative 
source of electricity in the event of technical failure. 
Alternative 
power source Number Output Age
Fuel 
consumption
UPS 4 - - -
Diesel 
generator 2
230 and 
90 kW
30 and 
32 years 50 litres/hour
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Tab. 3 Types of alternative backup power sources
Hospital 4
Hospital 4 has two electricity service lines. 
Distributor of this electricity is the company E.ON 
a.s. Directly in the premises of hospital 4, there are 
2 gas cogeneration units which produce 2 x 140 kW 
of electricity. This electricity is intended only for 
the needs of the hospital; the units are shut down 
in the event of a power failure. In this hospital, the 
emergency power supply is secured by an UPS unit, 
diesel generator and rechargeable batteries.
During power outages, in terms of providing the 
hospital acute and inpatient care, it is necessary to 
ensure operation of wards specifi c to this hospital. 
This can be partly achieved by ensuring adequate 
alternative sources of electricity according to 
Technical Standards (2013 and 1987).
In hospital 4, the most important backup power 
source is a diesel generator which is regularly tested 
once a week with load and once a week without load. 
Other backup alternative sources are represented by 
7 UPS units which ensure the operation of the labour 
ward, 3 operating theatres, central sterilization, 
intensive care unit and clinical biochemistry 
department. Types of alternative backup power 
sources in hospital 4 are presented in Tab. 4.
An important area of preparedness of hospitals to 
power outages is the amount of fuel available as fuel 
for diesel generators. In hospital 4, there are 400 litres 
of diesel fuel directly nearby the diesel generator 
and other barrels with the volume of 400 litres. 
At the given average diesel generator consumption 
of 40 litres/hour, the operation of hospital 4 will be 
secured for 20 hours. 
After this period of time, hospital 4 will have 
to ensure delivery of oil, which is not covered by 
contract. Hospital 4 would ensure the oil purchase 
from the nearest fi lling station. 
Tab. 4 Types of alternative backup power sources
Hospital 5
Electricity network around hospital 5 is a 110 kV 
high-voltage distribution network; new 110 kV power 
nodes were connected to increase its transmission 
capacity and operational security. This can be partly 
achieved by ensuring adequate alternative sources 
of electricity according to Technical Standards 
(2013 and 1987). Within its premises, hospital 5 has 
alternative sources in case of power failure. These 
premises are called energy blocks. In the hospital, 
there are several blocks of this type, which are part 
of individual hospital buildings or separate objects.
Inside energy blocks, there are diesel generators, 
machines supplying electricity to important 
workplaces and operations from a public source in 
case of power outages for the necessary period of 
time. Energy blocks also contain tanks with backup 
diesel fuel. The necessary period of time is set to 
a minimum of 15 hours. Failure of one energy 
block would not result in failures of other blocks. 
A schedule is prepared for each energy block and 
the relevant workplace of hospital 5  to verify the 
functionality of energy blocks, their functions and 
diesel fuel suffi ciency (for odd and even weeks, 
detailing the time and tests with load and without 
load).
Tab. 5 Types of alternative backup power sources
In the rooms for medical purposes, there are 
electrical circuits that are divided into 4 groups in 
accordance with their importance. Plug outlets are 
differentiated by colour according to these groups. 
The fi rst type includes very important circuits. 
Special emergency sources (UPS units) provide 
power even after the failure of the basic or main 
emergency source within 15 seconds. Sockets have 
orange colour. The second type includes important 
circuits. These circuits are connected to alternative 
sources of electrical energy which power these 
circuits within 120 seconds after the failure of the 
central power supply. Sockets have green colour. 
The third type includes circuits of medical isolated 
system. The system is powered from important 
circuits using a protective isolation transformer. 
Sockets have yellow colour. The fourth type includes 
less important circuits. Circuits for general use are 
Alternative power source Number Output Fuel consumption
UPS 3 - -
Diesel generator 1 272 kW 60 litres/hour
Mobile power generator 3 6 kW -
Alternative 
power source Number Output Age
Fuel 
consumption
UPS 7 - - -
Diesel 
generator 2 160 kW 35 years 40 litres/hour
Battery room 1 - - -
Alternative power 
source Number Output Age
Fuel 
consumption
UPS - - - -
Diesel generator 3 100 - 550 kW -
260 litres/
hour
Mobile power 
generator - - - -
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not connected to backup power sources. Socket 
colours are arbitrary, except orange yellow, green 
and red.
Discussion
Within the pilot study, it was necessary to 
analyse the current state of preparedness of hospitals 
to power outages. It was necessary to determine the 
strengths and weaknesses that will facilitate further 
deeper investigation and determination of solutions 
which would help hospitals to set up emergency 
preparedness and ensure their operation even in the 
event of a power failure. 
Strengths in the preparedness of hospitals 
to power outages
Determined strengths provide a solid foundation 
to the whole mechanism of preparedness, on which 
the hospitals can rely in case of ensuring their 
preparedness. The pilot study shows that it is a good 
basis for the entire system, which must be developed 
and built up. Strengths are presented in Tab. 6: 
1. Relevant standards: Existence of Technical 
Standards (2013 and 1987) provides guidance 
for the fundamental resolution to the crisis 
preparedness of hospitals with regard to technical 
solutions. 
2. Qualifi ed personnel: In each hospital, there is at 
least one employee responsible for the emergency 
power supply. This employee has the required 
qualifi cations and enough experience, knows the 
technical condition of medical equipment and is 
responsible for the functionality of individual 
components of the emergency power supply 
system in the hospital.
3. Central diesel generator: In each hospital, there 
is at least one central diesel generator which 
retains the functionality of specifi ed parts of 
the hospital within 120 seconds after the power 
supply from the grid has failed. Diesel generators 
allow partial and basic operation of the hospital 
and provision of basic medical care as needed.
4. Regular testing of emergency sources: Tests must 
be conducted regularly whereas their frequency 
is determined by ČSN. These tests ensure their 
functionality and readiness for power outages.
5. Own mobile power generators: Some hospitals 
have mobile power generators which can be 
used in places separated from emergency power 
supplies, or when the electricity transmission 
fails and it is necessary to restore supplies in 
important locations.
Weaknesses in the preparedness 
of hospitals to power outages
Determined weaknesses pose the greatest problem 
in ensuring emergency preparedness. All items 
described below represent weaknesses which indicate 
poor security of hospitals with regard to power 
outages. The results of the pilot study highlighted the 
future need to change the whole system and rethink 
the mechanisms and approaches which are currently 
set in the context of emergency preparedness of 
hospitals. Weaknesses are presented in Tab. 6:
1. Technical security: At present, the medical 
facilities are not capable of ensuring specialized 
examinations (such as CT, SONO, X-ray and 
skiascopy) in the event of electrical power 
failures. Energy demands of the respective 
devices do not allow them to be connected to 
emergency power sources. 
2. Fuels: In the hospitals, there are reserves of fuel to 
ensure the operation of emergency power sources 
for about 10-12 hours. The average consumption 
of diesel generators is high and reaches 
70-80 litres/hour. When the reserves are consumed 
and smooth supply of fuel is interrupted, the diesel 
generator stops running; afterwards, this adversely 
affects the operation of the hospital, especially in 
the sphere of health care for clients.
3. Technically outdated backup sources: Some 
hospitals are still equipped with technically 
outdated battery charging stations to ensure 
transmission of electrical energy from the battery 
charging station to electrical distribution systems. 
Compared to modern UPS units, this type of 
sources is quite diffi cult to maintain, especially 
with regard to the frequency of repairs needed.
4. Knowledge of personnel: Insuffi cient awareness 
of the issue of large-scale electrical power 
failures by both the operating personnel and 
management participates in the increased 
probability of equipment failure and lay-up, at 
least on a limited scale.
5. Documentation: Documentation available in 
hospitals is at good level but no documentation 
resolves preferential fuel supply for emergency 
power sources during a power failure.
Opportunities in the preparedness 
of hospitals to power outages
Currently, we have identifi ed four areas that 
could serve to improve the system of emergency 
preparedness. These mainly include technical and 
operational parts that require suffi cient funding 
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and knowledgeable staff dealing with this issue. 
Opportunities are presented in Tab. 6:
1. Updating of the plans: Some medical facilities 
are obliged to draw up plans for emergency 
preparedness fulfi lling tasks from the regional 
crisis preparedness plan, in which the hospital 
management should implement, among other 
things, preferential fuel supply for emergency 
power sources in the facility and add entities 
lending mobile power generators.
2. Modernization of diesel generators: Most diesel 
generators, which the hospitals can use, were 
acquired in the 1980s-1990s. Parameters of these 
diesel generators are lagging behind parameters 
of current sources; at the same time, frequency of 
their repairs increases and this ultimately affects 
the operation of the hospital. Therefore, it is 
advisable to modernize equipment through new 
and more powerful diesel generators.
3. Modernization of backup sources of E1 and 
E2 types: At the present time, the hospitals 
are gradually switching to modern UPS units; 
however, outdated battery charging stations are 
still used in some of them. 
4. Mobile power generators: Through acquisitions of 
mobile power generator, the hospitals can resolve 
some power outages in places separated from 
electricity supplies from diesel generators or secure 
operation of individual wards in case of failure. 
Threats in the preparedness of hospitals 
to power outages
The biggest problem of the functioning of 
hospitals during electrical power failures is 
represented by factors that can enter the system from 
outside. This mainly relates to the lack of fi nancial 
resources and possible underestimation of this issue 
at the level of state and local governments. Threats 
are presented in Tab. 6:
1. Limited fi nancial resources: Financial resources 
are one of the biggest problems which various 
health facilities are currently facing. Their lack 
does not allow modernization of equipment for 
securing emergency power supplies; typically, 
the funds for refurbishment and renovation of 
technical equipment are not available.
2. Failures of backup sources: This threat poses 
a serious threat to the operation of the facilities. 
A failure of emergency power source in the 
hospital occurred in 1998, during a power outage 
in New Zealand. 
3. Fuels: Large fuel consumption may lead to 
power supply failure and possible accumulation 
of other emergencies.
4. Domino effects on critical infrastructure: 
Electricity outage brings domino effects on 
critical infrastructure; this can cause paralysis of 
other important commodities which are needed 
for medical facilities (e.g. water supply, etc). 
Evaluation of the SWOT analysis
To accept proper strategies for improving 
emergency preparedness of hospitals, it was 
necessary to assess the SWOT analysis qualitatively. 
The assessment was based on the multi-criteria 
evaluation using Fuller's method, where each 
criterion is given its weight and subsequently, 
on grounds of expert estimate, its evaluation 
(the so-called score). For strengths and opportunities, 
we used a positive scale from 1 to 5, where the value 
of 5 indicates the highest satisfaction. For weaknesses 
and threats, we used a negative scale from -1 to -5, 
where the values of -1 and -5 indicate the lowest 
and highest dissatisfaction, respectively. The fi nal 
comparison of internal and external indicators 
resulted in the value of -0.79, which indicates a very 
weak solution of these problems in hospitals.
Tab. 6 SWOT analysis of the preparedness of 
hospitals to power outages
weight evaluation
1 Relevant standards 0,2 3
2 Qualified personnel 0,27 3
3 Central diesel generator 0,33 4
4 Regular testing of emergency sources 0,13 5
5 Own mobile power generators 0,07 3
TOTAL
weight evaluation
1 Updating of the plans 0,2 5
2 Modernization of diesel generators 0,4 4
3 Modernization of backup sources of E1 and 
E2 types
0,3 3
4 Mobile power generators 0,1 2
TOTAL 3,7
STRENGTHS
OPPORTUNITIES
3,59
?
weight evaluation
1 Technical security 0,14 -3
2 Fuels 0,29 -5
3 Technically outdated backup sources 0,21 -4
4 Knowledge of personnel 0,29 -3
5 Documentation 0,07 -3
TOTAL
weight evaluation
1 Limited financial resources 0,3 -5
2 Failures of backup sources 0,1 -2
3 Fuels 0,2 -4
4 Domino effects on critical infrastructure 0,4 -5
TOTAL -4,5
WEAKNESSES
THREATS
-3,58
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Balance of the SWOT analysis
The investigation shows that all the hospitals have 
a diesel generator. Specifi c technical requirements 
for ensuring emergency electricity supplies are 
defi ned in Technical Standards (2013 and 1987). 
Each hospital has at least one main emergency source 
of electricity - diesel generator. All the generators 
available in various hospitals were acquired before 
30 - 35 years. Consultations with experts indicate 
that the advantage of older generators consists 
in their relatively simple and inexpensive repair 
in case of faults, and that their main drawback is 
low reliability, despite the numerous tests made at 
regular weekly intervals.
The aim of the tests, which take place alternately 
with load and without load on a weekly basis, is to 
verify the functionality of diesel generators. The test 
without load is used to check the start-up speed of 
the generator which must be able to supply power 
within 120 seconds. In all the hospitals, it was found 
that this period does not exceed 20 seconds. The 
test with load is used to check parameters of diesel 
generators and connection to the hospital network. 
Although these tests are carried out according to 
Technical Standards (2013 and 1987), they can 
cause considerable complications for the hospital. 
Disconnection of the hospital from the grid and 
reconnection to the emergency power source affects 
activities of many medical devices and may lead 
to impairment of laboratory tests. It is also vital to 
always coordinate these tests with surgery activities 
in order to avoid any effects on medical equipment 
due to the changeover between the grid and 
generator. The tests are therefore conducted mostly 
in the early morning and all the wards (departments) 
are warned of these tests in advance. 
All diesel generators are subject to mandatory 
inspection tests during which service fl uids are 
changed and the overall condition of generators 
is checked. These revisions are carried out by an 
independent fi rm, but they are quite expensive.
Emergency power supplies by diesel generators 
require suffi cient reserves of fuel - diesel oil. 
It was found that fuel reserves in hospitals are 
roughly for 6-12 hours of operation; however, 
the consumption is high and ranges from 30 to 
100 litres/hour, depending on the energy need of the 
respective hospital, season and other factors. The 
quality of diesel oil is determined by the decree on 
the quality and evidence of fuel (Decree 133, 2010). 
For propulsion of diesel generators (such as backup 
sources of hospitals, rescue and fi re brigades), this 
decree recommends only fossil motor oil, i.e. motor 
oil without any addition of biofuels, preferably 
arctic motor oil. This quality grade of diesel fuel is 
not distributed in the Czech Republic. 
Hospitals have not yet solved preferential 
supplies with fuel and all buy fuel at petrol stations. 
During massive power failures, however, the 
majority of petrol pumps will not be in operation.
As a special emergency power source, all 
hospitals use UPS units or old battery charging 
stations. These devices should bridge the period 
between the loss of power from the grid and 
supplies from diesel generators. These emergency 
sources should be designed to supply electricity for 
three hours. However, the supplies depend on the 
instantaneous take-off by the respective ward and 
the time horizon regarding the endurance of these 
devices cannot be precisely defi ned.
During power outages, operation of hospitals 
will be partially restricted, but this will not result 
in any serious danger to the health and lives of 
clients. The biggest limitation of hospitals is seen in 
radiodiagnostic imaging devices such as CT, X-ray, 
MRI and others, where the energy requirements 
for running these devices are high and the main 
emergency power source would not handle such 
a load. In this situation, it is possible to use a portable 
X-ray unit which is located in the operating theatres 
and whose energy requirements are lower than in 
stationary X-ray devices. In all hospitals, except 
the restriction of radiodiagnostic departments, the 
operation of laundry, dining room and kitchen would 
also be limited; this represent a major problem with 
securing food for patients and staff.
To enhance the preparedness of hospitals to power 
outages, it will be necessary to gradually modern the 
entire system of emergency power supply. Initial 
step is to enhance the performance of generators 
and replace wiring materials and electrical wiring. 
Electrical wiring in older hospitals is outdated; 
it was designed for take-offs 30 years ago while 
today's requirements for wiring are substantially 
higher. At present, the hospitals modernize individual 
backup power sources, i.e. they are switching from 
battery charging rooms to modern UP units which 
have more sophisticated approach to providing 
instant energy for strategic wards and departments.
Conclusion
In the Czech Republic, no long-term and 
extensive power failure (blackout) occurred so far. 
The electricity grid is relatively strong and stable; 
this gives a certain amount of trust in the power 
distributors in terms of providing regular supplies. 
In this simplifi ed view, power outages are hardly 
likely.
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chosen due to a quick insight into the issue and 
rapid evaluation of the state of preparedness with 
respect to internal and external factors that enter 
the preparedness system. The results show that the 
balance of this SWOT analysis is not very fl attering. 
The resulting value (-0.79) means that it is necessary 
to work on improving the preparedness mechanism. 
It is especially necessary to update emergency 
preparedness plans, involve founders of hospitals to 
a greater extent and focus on technical condition of 
emergency sources.
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However, impacts of power failure are 
considerable. It is therefore necessary to continue 
to strengthen at least the basic preparedness in 
facilities which depend on electricity and which 
are not able to provide medical care at the desired 
level without it. A special position in the healthcare 
system appertains to hospitals; in these healthcare 
facilities, power outages immediately threaten lives 
of their clients. For this reason, each medical facility 
must have its own alternative source of electricity.
In hospitals, all issues of power outages are 
solved and conceived with regard to failures lasting 
for several hours. There is no preparedness for large 
and widespread outages affecting the entire region 
and related commodities such as water, heat, gas, 
food, etc.
The research included fi ve selected hospitals 
which have undergone the analysis of preparedness 
to power outages. SWOT analysis has been 
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